The Metric of Justice
Hans Kelsen, in his famous text “What is Justice?”, presents the thesis that justice is not an objectively measurable principle. His argument is based on the assumption that there is no unified, universally accepted metric for justice. And where there is no metric, there is also no standard—at least not in the strict sense. Therefore, justice, according to Kelsen, cannot serve as the foundation for evaluating law. Law should not derive from an indefinite ideal of justice but solely from its normative structure: from the establishment and validity of rules within a closed legal system.
This idea points to a fundamental connection between standard and metric. In mathematics, a metric means: a way to determine distances, compare sizes, and define orders. A standard is inconceivable without a metric, as comparison becomes possible only through it. Interestingly, mathematics also demonstrates a different phenomenon: Stable, precisely describable values emerge—even though they do not originate from a metric-based system.
An example of this is number theory. Natural numbers have no inherent metric in the proper sense. They are discrete, counting entities—not measuring ones. Nevertheless, through infinite iteration, new types of numbers emerge: irrational ones like the square root of 2, or transcendental ones like Pi or Euler’s number. These numbers are not merely mathematically exotic—they elude the rational-algebraic grasp of the original structure, yet they can be precisely determined through limit processes. Thus, there are systems in which new standards emerge even though no original metric existed. Order arises not from the presence of a measure but through the repetition and refinement of structure.
This observation can be surprisingly applied to the political system of democracy. Democracy is not a rigid order with a predetermined metric for what is just. Rather, it is an open, iterative process in which law is always negotiated in the context of historical, cultural, and social notions of justice. The positive aspect of positive law is not that it is absolutely valid—but that it can always be changed, improved, or replaced. It is an approximation, not an endpoint.
Kelsen himself recognizes this—perhaps without fully articulating it. Because although he rejects justice as an irrational ideal, he ultimately declares democracy to be the “relatively most just” form of state. This formulation is remarkable: It avoids the metaphysical claim of the absolute but emphasizes democracy’s function as a condition of possibility for the continuous search for justice. Democracy is not just because it delivers a just result but because it permits justice—through procedure, discourse, and revision.
Viewed this way, democracy resembles mathematical iteration: It begins without a metric, but through repetition, discourse, and reflection, normative structures arise that endure. Not because they are ultimately true but because they prove themselves in the process. The standard emerges in the execution. And that makes democracy—with all its imprecision—what Kelsen calls it: the relatively most just of all possible orders.
